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Two new books about intrusions and viruses remind us that attacks against our computers on
networks are the actions of human beings. Cliff StoH's book about the wily hacker who spent a year
beginning August 1986 attempting to use the Lawrence Berkeley Computer as a stepping-stone for
access to military secrets is a spy thriller that illustrates the weaknesses of our password systems and
the difficulties in compiling evidence against a hacker engaged in espionage. Pamela Kane's book
about viruses that attack IBM PC computers shows that viruses are the modern version of the old
problem of Trojan horse attack. It discusses the most famous viruses and their countermeasures,
and it comes with a floppy disk of utility programs that will disinfect your PC and thwart future
attack.
This is a preprint of the column The Science of Computing for
American Scientist 78, No. 1 (January-February 1990).
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between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
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It was early Friday October 13, 1989, in Baltimore. My taxi driver and I got into a
discussion of the misfortunes that might befall the world that day. I asked him if he'd
seen the newspaper headlines about the computer viruses that might strike that day.
"Yeah, I've seen those headlines. What the beck is a computer virus anyway?" he
asked.
"It's a program that gets into your personal computer when you don't expect it, and
then it does something nasty like wiping out your files," I responded.
"But how can a computer catch a virus? Does somebody sneeze on it?" he asked,
almost snickering.
"These aren't the usual viruses that you catch by contact with someone else," I
said. "They spread when you take a floppy disk from an infected computer and insert it
into an uninfected one. They can also spread over the telephone network -- computers
dial each other up all the time these days, you know."
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"You mean those things aren't germs? They're created intentionally by people?"
he asked in a troubled tone.
"Exactly," I replied.
"Why would anyone do that?" he exclaimed.
Why would anyone do that? This is one of the most important questions that we
face as we enter the twenty-first century, a crowded world that will be linked tightly by
networks of computers, a world that cannot work without the cooperation of many
people. Our world already contains people who wiU steal information from computers
attached to a network, people who will settle a grudge by attacking someone's
computers, and an expanding culture of young people who fancy themselves explorers of
vast electronic hinterlands that beckon to the adventurous. Primed by the ideas of
modern science fiction novels like William Gibson's Neuromancer, these self- styled
"cyberpunks" view computer networks as the new frontier of individuality, a hidden
universe through which their disembodied presences can roam forever.
Network intruders -- some would call themselves explorers or liberators -- have
found ways of using networks to dial into remote computers, browse through their
contents, and work their way into other computers. They have become skilled at
cracking the password protocols that guard computers and adept at tricking the operating
systems into giving them superuser or system manager privileges. They have also
created programs called worms and viruses that carry out these actions unattended and
replicate themselves endlessly -- electronic surrogates that can prowl the network
independent of their creators. We can expect steady increases in acts of crime,
espionage, vandalism, and political terrorism by computer in the years ahead.
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The phenomenon of widespread electronic intrusion is very recent. It is made
possible by the proliferation of personal computers and their connection to electronic
networks. Although technically sophisticated, intrusions are always the acts of human
beings. They occur against the background of a modern discourse that values individual
fights more highly than compromise and anonymity more than accountability. They can
be controlled by a combination of technical safeguards - a sort of network immune
system -- and hygienic procedures for using computers. But they cannot be eliminated.
Newspapers tell tales of growing public concern about the integrity and privacy of
information stored in computers. As electronic networking spreads around the globe,
making possible new international interactions and breaching barriers of language and
time, so rise the risks of damage to valuable information and the anxiety over attacks by
intruders, worms, and viruses. These concerns actually run much deeper than simple
protection of information. In a world of global markets, people are forming new
communities supported by networks of computers. Intrusions undermine the trust that
binds a community together and threaten its very existence: intruders challenge the way
we work together in a networked world.
The growing world network shares many characteristics with biological organisms,
especially an astronomical number of connections among a large number of simple
components. The overall system can exhibit behaviors that cannot be seen in an analysis
of its separate components. Like their biological counterparts, computer networks can
suffer disorders from small organisms that create local malfunctions; in large numbers,
these organisms can produce network-wide disorder. For this reason, the attacks against
networks of computers have biological analogies, and two of them, worms and viruses,
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are designated by explicit biological terminology (1).
The distinction between a virus and a worm is fine. Both are forms of automated
intrusion. Both propagate copies of themselves to other systems. Both are capable of
damage and may delay inflicting it until long after the infection. The main difference is
that a virus attempts to hide copies of itself inside other, legitimate programs, whereas a
worm appears as a separate program - but worms can disguise themselves, as did the
Intemet worm of 1988 (2). You may hear the terms used interchangeably in the trade
and even the in professional press. No matter: they are virtually indistinguishable.
Security experts refer to the programs left behind by intruders, worms, and viruses
as logic bombs and Trojan horses. A logic bomb is a program that damages or discloses
files after an appointed interval or at an appointed time; it can evade detection by waiting
to perform its deeds many hours, weeks, or months after it has been implanted. Favorite
dates include Fridays the thirteenth, April Fool's Day, and Halloween. A Trojan horse is
a program that performs an apparently useful function but contains a hidden logic bomb.
Its name recalls the legendary sneak attack by the Greek army at Troy.
Two recent books on this subject are worth making an effort to find. The first is
Clifford Stoll's The Cuckoo's Egg (3). Stoll writes with flair, wit, and disarming honesty
in the style of a detective story. He refers to the Trojan horses left by the intruder he was
tracking as "cuckoo's eggs," an allusion to the cuckoo's habit of tricking other birds into
raising its young by laying its eggs in their nests.
A 75-cent discrepancy in the accounting records of the computer at the Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) in August 1986 at drew Stoll into an investigation that
revealed an account not created by the system administrator. With the support of his lab
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director, StoI1 embarked on a quest to identify the intruder and tum him over to the
authorities. He quickly discovered that this intruder returned to the LBL system
frequently, carefully covering his tracks to evade observation by system managers; for
example, the intruder checked whether any system manager was logged in when he
himself logged in; once in, he checked whether any of the files he had left behind to ease
his return had been altered. Having satisfied himself that he Was not being observed, the
intruder set about trying to break into accounts on military computers attached to a
portion of the Research Internet called the Milnet (2,4). It should be noted that none of
these computers contains classified information.
Stoll set up a monitoring system that tapped the incoming lines on the computer
side of the modem, alerted him by phone beeper when the intruder logged in, and
captured the intruder's every keystroke on a line printer -- all this invisible to the
intruder. StoU then began working with the technicians of the telephone company and of
Tymnet, an international data network, to trace the incoming calls; he discovered that
they were coming by a tortuous path from a Mitre Corporation computer in Virginia,
across AT&T long lines to a Tymnet dialin port in Oakland, and then across Tymnet to
the LBL computer. When Stoll reported his findings to system administrators at Mitre,
they shut down their modems and broke the path.
In the final weeks of 1986, the intruder found another path over Tymnet to the LBL
computer and resumed his explorations of the Milnet. Stoll and his Tymnet colleague
traced the intruder's calls to a computer in West Germany. To lure the intruder into
staying long enough for the German authorities to locate the originating phone, Ston set
up a sting operation by creating files documenting an imaginary project called SDINET,
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a network supposedly connecting classified military computers doing SDI research. He
even planted an electronic mail message from the system programmer saying, "I've
concealed the SDI network port, and I doubt that many people will discover it." The
intruder spent many hours beginning in January 1987 copying the files from this project
and hunting for access to the SDI network -- hours that enabled StoU and his helpers to
trace the calls to Hannover, West Germany. In June of that year, the West German
authorities arrested Markus Hess and charged him with international espionage and
selling military secrets to the KGB. Hess was allied with members of the West German
Computer Chaos Club, who were supplying pilfered information to the KGB in return for
money and drugs. After nearly a year of suspense and intrigue, Stoll's "wily hacker"
was caught.
None of this was easy. The FBI eschewed involvement because there was no actual
compromise of national security and no loss of property. The CIA and NSA eventually
got involved as observers when Stoll was able to prove that the intruder sought military
information. Only after much cajoling of these agencies by Stoll and LBL officials were
the search warrants needed to perform the tracing of phone calls issued. The legal
actions against Hess and other members of the Chaos Club are still under way today.
The second book I am recommending is Pamela Kane's VJ.R.U.S.: Vital
Information Resources under Siege (5). This book gives a history of computer viruses
with special attention to their effects in the world of IBM PCs with the MS/DOS
operating system. It is accompanied by a 5-1/4" floppy disk inside the back cover, which
provides a suite of ten programs -- the "Dr. Panda Utilities" -- that the reader can install
on his PC for viral detection, removal, and recovery. I have not tried these programs
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myself and cannot endorse them here.
Kane recounts stories of Trojan horses, simple viruses, and break-ins from early
computers to today, a reminder that the problem of securing our information resources
from attack is quite old. Never letting us forget that human beings were responsible,
Kane discusses some of their motives: embezzlement, espionage, extortion, fraud,
hacking, piracy, revenge, and theft. She tells the stories of the first headline-winning PC
viruses and worms. One of these was called the "(c) Brain" virus because it relabeled
infected diskettes with this string. It originated in the Brain Computer Services store in
Lahore, Pakistan, in 1986, purportedly as a way to get even with Americans who were
using pirated copyright software. It apparently did no harm beyond reducing memory
space by about 7K bytes. Variations of this virus still infect disks today. The Lehigh
virus appeared on the campus of Lehigh University shortly before Thanksgiving 1987; it
infected floppy disks in the same way as the (c) Brain virus but destroyed the directory of
files on a disk after the fourth infection. Many students and faculty lost files to this virus.
A worm appeared in the IBM BITNET network at Christmas-time 1987, displayed a
Christmas message, and mailed copies of itself to others on the users' mailing lists; the
clogged network had to be shut down to purge all copies. The most famous worm,
released by a CorneU graduate student into the Research Internet on November 2, 1988,
infected nearly 3,000 computers and caused widespread disruption (but no destruction)
before it was stopped (2).
Kane looks behind the scenes at the hacker culture to show readers the kind of
thinking that guides the actions of those who break into computers. We learn that some
hackers consider exploring the invisible parts of telephone and computer networks as fun,
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a challenge tobc undertaken inthe faceof risk.Others say they are doing societya favor
by exploringthe weaknesses of thesesystems and exposing them beforea realcriminal
does seriousharm. Stillotherssay they arc protectingsocietyby revealinglarge
corporateand government databasesabout individuals.Many engage in "phone
phreaking," the actof using freetelephonecallsto gain accesstoremote computers.
Once in,they mostly justlook around, but sometimes they stealdata and programs for
distributionvia bulletinboards.
The second halfof Kanc's book isa descriptionof the means by which viruses
operateand the ways the Dr. Panda Utilitiescan thwartthem; itiswrittenata levelthat
most PC userscan understand. An appendix gives a complete securitychecklistfor a PC.
The most important safeguard:maintain adequate backups. Another appendix isa listof
allvirusesknown inmid-1989 thatattackPCs.
These books make iteasy to see thatsome straightforwardtechnologicalfixes
would greatlyreduce futurethreats.But technologicalfixesarc not the answer; they are
validonly untilsomeone launches a kind of new attack.Changes inthe ways we use
computers, however, will reduce our exposure to our own and others' frailties (4,6).
The books also remind us that worms and viruses are mere programs. They are not
capable of intelligent action, as envisaged by another taxi driver who spoke to me late
that same Friday: "You know, everyone thinks we got off light on those computer
viruses that were supposed to attack today. Everyone thinks it was a hoax. But the
viruses outwitted them. They got into the stock market computers. That's what caused
the crash today. I know!"
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